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ABSTRACT

Although ethnicity has generally been relegated to secondary status as an explanatory factor in urban political participation studies, this research hypothesizes that ethnicity plays a major role in determining communal political participation. Communal participation is defined as participation in which the individual acts in concert with or on behalf of members of the wider community. The study was based on a 1973 survey of Jews, Irish, Blacks, Cubans, Dominicans, and Puerto Ricans in an urban Manhattan neighborhood. Regression analyses were performed relating the ethnic identities of these six groups to their political attitudes (awareness, involvement, knowledge, cynicism, and efficacy), and political participation (contacting officials, joining organizations, signing petitions, and attending protests). Findings indicated that one's ethnic identity affected political participation in three ways. Ethnic groups were predisposed to (1) participate or not participate in political culture according to group value orientations; (2) exhibit interest or lack of interest in political affairs according to the political consciousness and activity of one's ethnic group; and (3) act either frequently or infrequently in a cooperative manner with people who are outside of one's primary social network in accordance with group interaction norms. The conclusion is that ethnicity has a major effect on the level of participant political culture and is largely independent of social class. Tables and diagrams are included. (Author/DB)

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ETHNIC SOURCES OF NON-ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN AN URBAN SETTING

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SP 010 648

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, a strong consensus has been building on the underlying sources of political participation. Students of participation have increasingly come to view social class (or SES) as the most important influence on the level of participation behavior. Verba and Nie symbolize this consensus when they refer to the relationship between SES and participation as the "Standard SES Model."[1]

As consensus has grown on the role of SES, attention has been diverted from the influence of personality and ethnicity. Verba and Nie, for example, in their already classic work on participation, make only one passing reference to ethnicity and no reference to personality per se.[2] When compared to earlier works on participation by such writers as Lane, Milbrath, and Berelson et al., the omission is striking and indicative of a trend to downplay the importance of non-SES factors.[3]

There are two major reasons why ethnicity has been relegated to secondary status as an explanatory factor in participation. For one, many social scientists have been so steeped in the normative dimensions of the "melting pot" myth that they are unwilling (or unable) to conceive of ethnicity as an enduring and important dimension of social division. To be sure, race has long been recognized as an enduring basis of socio-political conflict, but the belief that religious and nationality dimensions of ethnicity could also withstand the onslaught of the "inevitable" assimilation process is a recent one.

A second reason (related to the first) centers on the empirical relationship between ethnicity and SES. Conceptually, it is not difficult to distinguish between social class status and ethnicity. In the United States, at any rate, class status is based primarily on achievement criteria (i.e., income, educational level, occupational prestige), whereas ethnic status is based primarily on ascriptive criteria (i.e., race, religion, and nationality).[4]

However clear the conceptual distinctions between ethnic status and class status, they are nonetheless highly related empirically. Those who share a common ethnic background tend to share a common class position as well. Given the high empirical correlation between class and ethnicity, it is difficult to determine whether each has an independent influence on participation. Simply put, the question is as follows: does one individual participate more than (or in different ways from) another because of his ethnicity, or because of his social class position?

Despite the four logically possible answers, only two arguments are given much sway in the participation literature. Many contend that the relationship between ethnicity and participation is spurious, and that social class is the "true" causal factor.[5] There is also a growing but less prominent literature arguing for the joint impact of ethnicity and social class.[6] The notion that ethnicity has an impact that is independent of its relationship to social class is held by relatively few students of participation.[7]

As a result of the commonly held view that non-ethnic factors account for ethnic differences in participation, few empirical studies of participation have focused on ethnicity. Theories relating ethnicity to participation are equally rare, and those that have been put forward are not very

advanced. Our purpose in the present paper is to contribute to theory building, by outlining a theory of the impact of ethnicity on political participation and by testing that theory empirically. It is our contention that ethnicity's impact is major and largely independent of SES. We will focus on non-electoral participation that is communal in form. By "communal" we mean that the individual participant is acting in concert with (or on behalf of) members of the wider community. Specifically, four forms of communal participation will be examined: contacting (local) public officials about community problems, joining community problem-solving organizations, signing petitions for neighborhood improvement, and attending community protest demonstrations.

The essential link between ethnicity and communal participation is ethnic political culture. We maintain that the political cultures of some ethnic groups are more participant-oriented than those of other ethnic groups. As a result of cultural differences, the level of communal participation varies between ethnic groups. We will attempt to demonstrate this thesis through an examination of political attitudes and participation among six ethnic groups: Jews, Irish, American Blacks, Cubans, Dominicans, and Puerto Ricans. The data base of this paper is a survey conducted in northern Manhattan (the Washington Heights-Inwood section) under the auspices of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, during the winter and early spring of 1973.

In the first section of this paper we will take a closer look at the nature of communal participation. This will entail an examination of the urban milieu of the study, the problem-solving aspect of non-electoral participation, the important distinction between communal and individual

participation, and the relationship between communal action, on the one hand, and voting, particularized contacting, and subsistence political activity on the other.

The second section of the paper is devoted to a presentation of the theory and to the analysis of data. First, the crucial connection between culture, problem-solving behavior, and ethnicity is explored. The overall theory is then summarized, followed by a more detailed look at each of three causal paths linking ethnicity to communal participation. Next, the theoretical model is diagrammatically represented, and the empirical findings are summarized. In the concluding section, we discuss the importance of our findings for ethnic politics in general and for political participation theory in particular.

PARTICIPATION AS PROBLEM-SOLVING BEHAVIOR

The Local and Urban Context

In this paper, we will examine only participation that occurs at the local level and in an urban setting. Besides the importance of local or "grassroots" participation to democratic theory, there are other reasons for examining ethnicity and participation at the local level. For one, it is here that one would expect to find the greatest frequency of communal participation. This is so because local governments are physically (and perhaps therefore psychologically) closer to the individual. Agents of local governments are more visible and accessible, and local governments are often more understandable to the individual than are governments at higher levels. In the Almond and Verba five-nation study, which included the United States, the percentage of those who said they understood local issues "very well" was three times as great as the percentage of those who

said they understood national issues very well.[8] Further, people report attempting to influence local governments much more frequently than they do national governments. In fact, in the United States, the ratio is about two to one.[9]

The urban context of local participation is also particularly advantageous for the purposes of this study. We assume that communal activity (especially in the form of contacting public officials) is more frequent in urban environments than in most rural or suburban locations, since urban man is more dependent on public agencies for services that are often performed privately or not at all in smaller communities (e.g., transportation, sanitation, welfare). It is also in urban areas that ethnic diversity is greatest, and where a variety of ethnic groups are large enough to be adequately sampled.

Political Problem Solving

While the analyst is often concerned primarily with the implications of participation for equality at the system level, the individual's interest in participation may be quite different. In fact, students of participation have uncovered a number of major conscious motives, only a few of which touch on the desire to contribute to equality in the society at large.[10] But many different acts of political participation share at least one common element: they are attempts to solve problems (real or perceived) through interaction with political authorities and agencies. An individual, faced with a problem that affects him personally or as part of a larger group, seeks benefits--in the form of goods, services, redress of grievances, psychological or emotional satisfaction--from the political system.

By looking at certain forms of participation from a problem-solving perspective, one can better understand why there may be different sources

for different types of participation. Some acts appear to have a clear problem-solving focus, while others do not. For example, when a tenant calls a government housing agency to complain about lack of heat, it can be assumed that he is responding to a personal problem by seeking assistance from political authorities. On the other hand, it is more difficult to infer a problem-solving motivation for voting and other electoral activity. Such activity can be (and often is) undertaken for reasons not closely related to the seeking of concrete benefits from political authorities. Thus, although contacting housing agencies and electoral behavior are both forms of participation, the former is clearly a problem-solving act, while the latter often has no clear problem stimulus.[11]

Political participation qua problem solving encompasses a variety of particular acts, including any interaction between private individuals and public officials where the individuals are seeking relatively specific benefits through the political system. Although the proportion of participation acts that can be considered problem-oriented depends on one's operational definitions, it is clear that political participation as problem solving is fairly common.

Just as some forms of participation (like electoral activity) are not viewed as forms of political problem-solving behavior, not all forms of problem solving are also forms of participation. Subsistence political activity is a case in point. Political participation is usually defined as <u>voluntary</u> behavior; therefore, since the seeking of subsistence aid is essentially <u>involuntary</u>, individuals who contact government for welfare and other life-sustaining support are not, in our view, performing an act of political participation. They are, however, clearly performing an act of political problem solving.

Thus, political participation and political problem solving are not coterminous, but they are related. And at the intersection between the two, one can distinguish between political activity that is individual in form, and activity that is communal in form. When an individual seeks benefits only for himself or his immediate family, he is exhibiting an individual style that we will call personal service seeking. Individuals who work with others outside their immediate family for common purposes are exhibiting a communal style. Since the focus of this study is on communal participation-political problem solving, it may be useful to identify some of the key reasons why communal (and not individual) participation was selected.

There are two major reasons for focusing on communal rather than personal action. One is simply that the concept of participation usually conjures up an image of collective action in the political arena. Calling the police to report a mugging is not typically seen as an act of political participation. Conversely, communal action is more obviously an attempt to directly affect public policy, and it is more likely than individual action to be effective in influencing such policy. As Verba and Nie point out, "Particularized contacts can be effective for the individual contactor but they are inadequate as a guide to more general social policy."[12]

A second reason for focusing on communal action relates to the possibility of locating its general sources, whereas such sources are more difficult to discover for individual action. Verba and Nie, for example, found no correlation between particularized contacting and SES, political attitudes, age, organizational activity, or partisanship.[13] That these same variables are important sources of cooperative and electoral behavior (especially campaign activity) suggests that contacting government strictly

for personalized benefits is a very different form of political behavior. It also suggests that particularized contacting may result from idiosyncratic sources.

To summarize, the dependent variable of this study is communal participation at the local level and in an urban context. Further, communal participation is also conceived of as a form of political problem-solving behavior. Diagram 1 visually portrays the conceptual interrelationship between participation and political problem-solving behavior.



Diagram 1. The Relationship between Political Participation and Political Problem Solving.

A Factor Analysis of Seven Political Acts

Having made conceptual distinctions between participation and problem solving, voluntary versus involuntary behavior, and communal versus individual action, we are now in the position to determine whether the various forms of political behavior discussed are empirically distinct as well. Of primary interest is the distinctiveness of communal participation.

Besides the four communal acts identified above--contacting officials, joining organizations, signing petitions, and attending protest demonstrations--survey questions were used to determine whether, in the past few years, respondents had ever: (1) voted in city elections, (2) individually contacted an unemployment, social security, or welfare office for help with a problem related to financial subsistence, or (3) contacted a city official or agency to seek personal (particularized) services.

With the aid of factor analysis, we will attempt to determine whether the four communal participation acts constitute a form of political behavior distinct from voting, subsistence political activity, and personal service seeking. Table 1 presents the factor loadings from a varimax rotated, principal components (PA2) analysis of the seven political acts. Only U.S. citizens were included in the analysis because voting and subsistence activity require such citizenship.[14]

TABLE 1

VARIMAX ROTATED-FACTOR MATRIX FOR SEVEN POLITICAL ACTS AMONG CITIZENS ONLY (N=275)

Political Act	Component I	Component II	Communalities
Joining Organizations	.75	-.09	.56
Contacting Officials	.59	.09	.36
Signing Petitions	.48	.18	.26
Attending Protests	.46	.14	.23
Voting in City Elections	.26	.10	.08
Personal Service Seeking	.08	.59	.36
Subsistence Activity	-.05	-.21	.05
% of Total Variance	77.4	22.6	52.0
Eigenvalue	1.47	0.43	--

The data in Table 1 are quite revealing as to the nature of political activity at the community level. The table demonstrates that there are four distinct dimensions of political activity, three of which are interrelated. Subsistence activity is shown to constitute one dimension by itself. It is uncorrelated with the communal items and has a moderately negative correlation with personal service seeking (component II). Voting, while more highly correlated with communal activity, has too low a factor loading to be considered as a communal act. Personal service seeking (particularized contacting) has a slightly positive relationship with voting and three of the four communal acts, but it has a near-zero loading on component I; it is therefore best viewed as a separate dimension of participation.

That service seeking, voting, and communal participation are intercorrelated suggests that they are all "measuring" a general form of behavior we can call "political participation." But the results of the factor analysis lead to the conclusion that it is better to construct three distinct measures of community political participation (communal, electoral, and personal service seeking) than to create a single participation index.[15] Thus, having demonstrated that communal participation is an empirically distinct form of participation, we turn our attention to the role of ethnicity.

ETHNICITY AND COMMUNAL PARTICIPATION: A PARTIAL THEORY

Culture, Problem Solving, and Ethnicity

Although the term "culture" is one of the most complex and richest concepts in the social sciences, there appears to be a good deal of consensus on its problem-solving base. Ford, for instance, states that culture

"consists of learned problem-solutions."[16] Young equates "folkways" with culture and defines folkways as "continuous methods of handling problems and social situations."[17] And Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck argue that value orientations are essential for interpreting social behavior, because they "give order and direction to . . . human acts and thoughts as these relate to the solution of 'common human' problems."[18]

If culture acts as a guide to social problem-solving behavior in general, then political culture (as a dimension of general culture) guides problem solving in the political realm. As Verba puts it, political culture affects "when and in what ways individuals become involved in political life. Looked at this way, it can be seen that political culture represents a system of control vis-a-vis the system of political interactions."[19] It follows that, if ethnic groups exhibit different political cultures, members of different ethnic groups will exhibit varying levels and/or styles of political problem-solving behavior.

In order to measure political culture, we have selected five basic (or underlying) political attitudes for analysis. The first four--political involvement (interest in politics), political efficacy, political cynicism, and civic awareness--are all commonly used in participation and political research, and therefore need little introduction here. The fifth attitude, community political knowledge, was chosen for its special relevance to local participation. By "community political knowledge" we mean an individual's knowledge of people and places in his community that help members of that community deal with local government. It is an attitude related to both political involvement and civic awareness, in that it reflects a high value placed on political solutions and, to some extent, an awareness of what is going on in the community.

The five political attitudes described above will be used to measure political culture, but it should be noted that we do not view these attitudes as separate and unrelated. Rather, we believe that they are all highly interrelated. Only when taken together, as a unit, can they properly reflect an individual's (or group's) political culture. After all, when we speak of culture, we are generally referring to a set or cluster of values, norms, beliefs, and attitudes. Table 2, a Pearson correlation matrix, provides evidence that the five attitudes selected to measure political culture do in fact constitute a cluster of attitudes.

TABLE 2

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL ATTITUDES
(N=379)

Attitude	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Involvement	--	.48	.38	.32	.22
2. Efficacy		--	.26	.19	.17
3. Awareness			--	.40	.23
4. Knowledge				--	.15
5. Cynicism					--

On the basis of the correlation matrix shown in Table 2, the five attitudes were standardized and combined to form an overall attitude index.[20] Having constructed such an index, we now seek to determine whether the index and the separate items within it are related to communal participation. Table 3 represents the Pearson r (zero-order) correlations between political attitudes (including the overall attitude index) and acts of communal participation (including the participation index).

TABLE 3

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND COMMUNAL PARTICIPATION (N=379)

Attitude	Partic. Index	Contact Officials	Join Orgs.	Sign Petitions	Attend Protests
Involvement	.36	.30	.26	.26	.18
Awareness	.37	.28	.27	.28	.16
Efficacy	.33	.23	.25	.25	.17
Knowledge	.30	.34	.19	.19	.14
Cynicism	.24	.14	.16	.17	.22
Attitude Index	.49	.40	.35	.35	.27

The importance of political attitudes to communal participation can be easily ascertained from the data in Table 3. The relationship between the attitude index and the participation index is particularly strong (r=.49). As a predictor variable, the attitude index alone explains about 24.2% of the variance in communal participation. With few exceptions (e.g., the relatively low correlations between most attitudes and protesting), the findings support our contention that the attitudes chosen to measure political culture are strongly related to communal participation. Therefore, in the analysis that follows, we shall refer to the political attitudes index as "participant political culture." Our theory and data analysis will focus on how much and in what ways ethnicity affects participant culture, and through it communal participation.

The Theory Summarized

Diagram 2 summarizes our theory, which posits three paths running from ethnicity to communal political participation, all three of which pass

through participant political culture. For visual clarity, each path is indicated by a different kind of arrow.



Diagram 2. A Partial Theory of the Relationship between Ethnicity and Communal Political Participation.

The central thrust of the theory is cultural. Some ethnic groups exhibit higher levels of communal participation than others, in part because they possess a political culture (reflected in political attitudes) that is more supportive of participation. The underlying values that constitute political culture are resources that are unequally distributed among ethnic groups. Thus, ethnic status, like class status, can lead to inequalities in the political realm, by making it more or less likely that individuals will hold the values that lead to participation and its benefits.

The first causal path of the theory links nominal ethnic identity (i.e., the individual's racial, religious, and/or nationality background) directly to participant political culture. We maintain that such a direct relationship results from differences in political culture between ethnic groups. Some ethnic groups exhibit political cultures more conducive to

political participation than do other ethnic groups. Since the degree to which socialization transmits participant-oriented values varies between ethnic groups, the extent to which most people are exposed to such values is partly a function of the accident of birth.

The second causal path emphasizes interrelationships between the various dimensions of ethnicity. Nominal ethnic identity is seen as a source of variation in both ethnic social cohesion and ethnic consciousness. Social cohesion is also viewed as a determinant of ethnic consciousness, but not directly of participant political culture. Ethnic consciousness (especially ethnic political consciousness), on the other hand, does have a direct relation to such culture. Since his own destiny is tied, in part, to the group's progress, the politically-conscious individual is predisposed to take a special interest in political affairs. His political consciousness leads to increased political involvement, civic awareness, and other participant-relevant political attitudes. The politically-conscious individual looks at government as both a distributor and a withholder of benefits. Local government (especially in urban contexts) takes on particular significance, since it gives and withholds services important to the achievement of group goals. And at the local level, other ethnic groups may be seen as winning a kind of "zero-sum" game for benefits if political action is not taken to promote and/or defend group interests.

A third way that ethnicity affects participant political culture is through its impact on neighboring relations. Because levels of social trust vary between ethnic groups as a result of cultural differences, one's ethnic identity affects how often and in what ways he will interact with people (including neighbors) who are outside of his primary social network. In general, the more one interacts with his neighbors, the more he becomes

involved in and identifies with the broader community. The more frequent one's interaction with neighbors, the greater is his exposure to the nature and magnitude of community problems, as well as the actions (or inaction) of local government and community residents in attempting to deal with those problems. Therefore, the more intense neighboring relations, the greater the tendency to take an active interest in community political affairs; the result is a corresponding increase in the level of participant political culture exhibited. Thus, ethnicity affects participant political culture through its relationship to neighboring relations.

In sum, our thesis is that ethnicity is a meaningful predictor of political participation (in particular, communal participation), and that its effect on participation is largely the result of its relationship to political culture. The testing of our theory will involve a separate examination of each causal path. The nature of the causal links will be described in detail, and analysis of survey data will be undertaken to provide support for our theory. Finally, the overall model will be presented and the findings summarized.

Path I: Ethnic Identity and Participant Political Culture

The first path linking ethnicity to communal participation runs from nominal ethnic identity to participant political culture, and from culture to communal participation.[21] We maintain that the value orientations of some ethnic groups lead to political attitudes which predispose individuals to participate politically and communally; the value orientations of other ethnic groups lead to a non-participant political culture, which impedes communal participation.

The reasons why political culture varies from one ethnic group to

another are complex and difficult to identify through empirical analysis. This is because sources of variation in ethnic political culture are rooted in the recent and distant past. Once basic cultural patterns are established for a group, they tend to change very slowly. Drastic social change and dramatic political events and crises can permanently alter political culture. For example, the Depression and the New Deal probably altered the way people viewed the proper role of government in American society. As Antunes and Gaitz point out, the civil rights movement and urban and racial violence probably had a dramatic effect on the participation norms of Black Americans.[22] But generally speaking, in the absence of major socio-political change, political culture tends to evolve slowly. Changes in values are greatly dependent on changes in political socialization patterns, and many observers have pointed to the basically conservative nature of socialization.

From the vantage point of hindsight, it now appears that early students of ethnicity over-estimated the extent to which assimilation and acculturation would occur. In the past ten to fifteen years, many social scientists have moved away from the "melting pot" myth and its view of rapid or complete assimilation as inevitable. But acculturation is still assumed to be rapid and complete. As a result, cultural models of ethnic group behavior are not commonly employed by social science observers.

Our contention is that "cultural pluralism" is very much alive, at least in terms of <u>political</u> culture differences between ethnic groups. Especially when examining fundamental political values, it can be questioned whether the mass media and educational institutions have really brought about a complete uniformity of political culture among Americans of different ethnic backgrounds.

To what extent, then, does the knowledge of an individual's ethnic

identity enable one to predict his political attitudes? We can begin to answer this question by using dummy variable regression analysis to determine how much variation in political attitudes is explained by ethnic identity alone.

TABLE 4

DUMMY VARIABLE REGRESSION: POLITICAL ATTITUDES
WITH ETHNIC IDENTITY
(Betas)

Ethnic Identity*	Attitude Index	Awareness	Involvement	Knowledge	Cynicism	Efficacy
IRISH	.13	.17	.02	.06	-.01	.16
BLACKS	.08	.10	-.07	.11	.06	.05
CUBANS	-.39	-.35	-.31	-.23	-.29	-.09
DOMINICANS	-.46	-.36	-.45	-.23	-.26	-.22
PUERTO RICANS	-.16	-.21	-.13	-.13	-.01	-.06
Multiple R =	.60	.56	.45	.36	.36	.31
Multiple R^2 =	.36	.31	.20	.13	.13	.10

* When a multiple-category, nominal-level variable like ethnic identity is used in regression, it must be represented by dummy variables, the number of which must equal N-1 categories of the variable. To include all categories of the nominal-level variable would over-determine the correlation matrix on which the regression is based.

Jews will be the "comparison group" (i.e., the excluded category) in all dummy-variable regression tables using the entire sample as the data base and involving nominal ethnic identity. Therefore, Jews will not appear in the listings of ethnic groups in these tables. Each beta in such tables represents the difference between Jews and the ethnic group in question. The resultant R and R^2 (technically eta and eta^2) are to be interpreted the same as they would be if all variables in the regression equation were ordinal- or interval-level variables.

The data reported in Table 4 provide strong initial evidence for our contention that ethnic identity is a major predictor of political attitudes. With a multiple R of .60 with the overall attitude index, it can be said that

ethnic identity predicts 36% of the variation in political attitudes. Although the amount of variance explained by ethnic identity does vary among individual items of the attitude index (i.e., from a low R^2 of .10 to a high of .31), for all five of the items the correlation is substantial.

There is a possibility, however, that the relationship discovered between ethnic identity and political attitudes is spurious. To test for that possibility, we introduce ethnic identity and selected non-ethnic variables into a multiple regression analysis. Table 5 reports the results.

TABLE 5

MULTIPLE REGRESSION: POLITICAL ATTITUDES WITH ETHNIC IDENTITY AND SELECTED CONTROL VARIABLES (N=379)*

Independent Variable	B**	Standard Error (of B)	Beta	Simple r
Social Class (SES)	.44	.07	.31	.49
Sex (male+)	.62	.26	.09	.19
Age	.00	.01	-.01	.01
Length of Res.	1.26	.53	.13	.50
IRISH	1.31	.44	.15	.13
BLACKS	1.58	.46	.18	.08
CUBANS	-1.42	.48	-.18	-.39
DOMINICANS	-2.08	.53	-.23	-.46
PUERTO RICANS	- .63	.49	-.07	-.16

Multiple R = .69
Multiple R^2 = .47

* Unless otherwise indicated, the N for all remaining tables in this paper will be 379.

** Unstandardized regression coefficient.

Table 5 provides interesting information to interpret. Both SES and ethnic identity prove to be the strongest predictors of political attitudes.

Length of residence has a marginally important impact (beta=.13), while sex and particularly age explain very little about political attitudes.[23] A comparison of B's with their standard errors for all variables reveals that the probability that the betas are zero realistically exists only for age and Puerto Ricans. The fact that the multiple R^2 for the entire regression is .47 means that the variables selected as independent explain almost half of the variance in political attitudes. The reductions in correlations for length of residence, SES, and nominal ethnic identity reflect the fact that these three independent variables are highly correlated (SES with ethnic identity, R=.48; SES with length of residence, r=.40; and ethnic identity with length of residence, R=.69). A commonality analysis[24] was therefore performed to sort out the unique and common variances explained by these three independent variables. Table 6 reports the results.

TABLE 6

COMMONALITY ANALYSIS: UNIQUE AND COMMON VARIANCES IN POLITICAL ATTITUDES EXPLAINED BY ETHNIC IDENTITY, LENGTH OF RESIDENCE, AND SES

Variance Explained	1 Ethnic Identity	2 Length of Residence	3 SES
R^2 Unique to 1	.1141		
R^2 Unique to 2		.0070	
R^2 Unique to 3			.0792
R^2 Common to 1 & 2	.1040	.1040	
R^2 Common to 1 & 3	.0179		.0179
R^2 Common to 2 & 3		.0149	.0149
R^2 Common to 1, 2, & 3	.1255	.1255	.1255
Sum: Multiple R^2=.4626	.3615	.2514	.2375

From the data in Table 6 it can be surmised that the best social background predictors of political attitudes in our sample are ethnic identity and SES, with ethnic identity being the better predictor of the two. Other than through its joint impact with ethnic identity and SES, length of residence has very little effect on attitudes. It is particularly related to ethnic identity, and the fact that a good portion of variance explained by ethnic identity is not shared with length of residence (i.e., 11.4%) suggests a spurious direct relationship between length of residence and political attitudes. Ethnic identity and SES, then, emerge as the key explanatory variables.

The results of the multivariate analyses performed in this section strongly support that portion of our theory which causally links ethnic identity and participant political culture. Of all variables examined, ethnic identity is the best single predictor of political attitudes. The fact that control variables do not "wash away" the relationship adds further support to our contention that there are political culture differences between ethnic groups in the sample. SES was also found to be a strong predictor of political attitudes, and much of its impact on attitudes was discovered to be independent of its relationship to ethnic identity.

Path II: The Role of Ethnic Group Factors

However they are related empirically, there are at least two conceptually distinct kinds of ethnic groups--the social and the psychological. The ethnic group as a social group is defined by the amount and kind of social interaction between individuals who share common ethnic background characteristics of race, religion, and/or nationality. In other words, the degree of ethnic social cohesion (as measured by intra-ethnic marriage, friendship

patterns, institutional associations, etc.) determines the size and density of the ethnic social group.

A second kind of ethnic group is psychological in nature. Membership in a psychological group is manifested by a set of attitudes reflecting positive identification with group goals and aspirations and/or negative identification with group problems. Ethnic attitudes which reflect such positive and negative group identification we shall refer to as ethnic consciousness.

Ethnic consciousness, then, is not a single attitude. In addition to its positive and negative components, it would also appear to have social as well as political dimensions. By ethnic social consciousness we mean a desire to maintain the social boundaries that make for social cohesion within the ethnic group and that separate members of the group from individuals who do not share their ethnic identity. This essentially manifests itself in a preference for friends, spouses, and neighbors who share the same ethnic identity. While such preferences may have political ramifications, they have no specifically political content. We reserve the term ethnic political consciousness for ethnic consciousness that does have such content, and we shall mean by it individual identification with the political problems (e.g., lack of political clout), goals, aspirations, and interests of the ethnic group.

A set of individuals sharing similar racial, religious, and/or nationality characteristics is sometimes referred to as an ethnic group. But for the sake of conceptual clarity we will reserve the term "group" for individuals who exhibit some degree of ethnic social or psychological cohesion. Those who merely share the same ethnic identity (based on background characteristics)we will call an ethnic collectivity.

Thus, we conceive of the term ethnicity as being composed of four separate elements--three group factors (social cohesion, social consciousness,

and political consciousness) and one individual factor (ethnic identity). We maintain that all four dimensions of ethnicity are interrelated in the following manner: (1) Ethnic identity is a determinant of all group dimensions of ethnicity. That is, different ethnic groups vary in their levels of ethnic social cohesion and ethnic consciousness; thus, one's ethnic background affects the likelihood that he will confine his most important social relationships to other ethnic group members or come to identify with group goals; (2) Since historically the rise of ethnic social groups usually occurs prior to the development of ethnic consciousness, the more socially cohesive an individual is with his fellow ethnics, the more likely he is to develop a preference for ethnically homogeneous social networks (i.e., social consciousness); and (3) Ethnic social consciousness is, in turn, a source of ethnic political consciousness. For the ethnically-conscious individual, social, economic, and political interests become indistinguishable from each other over time. This is because political involvement is regarded as a means of protecting and/or promoting the social and economic interests of the group. Thus, the development of a strong ethnic social consciousness leads to an identification with the problems and aspirations of the group, including its political problems and aspirations.

It is through ethnic political consciousness that the group dimensions of ethnicity have their most direct impact on participant political culture. The politically-conscious individual comes to view political authorities and institutions as potential problem-solving sources. The political arena is seen as one in which group aspirations and goals can be pursued and perhaps realized. The government is thus perceived as a distributor of group-relevant benefits like jobs, education, community services, and relief from discrimination.

On the negative side, government may also be seen as a withholder of benefits. Individuals with a high level of ethnic political consciousness tend to be sensitive to how impartial the local government is in administering its services. They are more likely to believe that local government plays favorites between ethnic groups, because they look at it in ethnic terms.

Because government action has relevance for their own and their ethnic group's present and future welfare, those with a high level of ethnic political consciousness are more likely to develop high levels of political involvement, civic awareness, and community political knowledge. In addition, their levels of political efficacy are likely to rise, since (at least in a psychological sense) they can draw on group support for any political action they take. Because of their conflictual orientation (vis-a-vis other ethnic groups) and their sensitivity to government impartiality, as psychological involvement increases, political trust declines, and political cynicism takes its place. Local government, it is felt, cannot be trusted to do what is "right" (i.e., impartially serve the interests of the entire community), because it is subject to group pressures and responds most favorably to those groups which are most successful at exercising influence.

Our theory, then, states that heightened ethnic political consciousness leads individuals to possess a more participant political culture. Four separate regression equations were created to test the interrelationship between ethnic dimensions and the impact of ethnic political consciousness on participant culture. As a control variable, only SES (among non-ethnic background variables) had a significant influence; therefore, other background variables are omitted from the analysis that follows. For the sake of simplicity, the findings of the regression analyses are summarized in diagram form.



Diagram 3. The Impact of Ethnic Group Factors on Participant Political Culture (Betas)*.

*The R^2 reported for ethnic identity is the amount of unique variance explained. That is, it is the amount of variance explained by ethnic identity when entered last in stepwise regression. Figures in parentheses for ethnic identity equal the amount of variance explained by ethnic identity alone. For all other variables, the numerical values are betas (standardized regression coefficients or path coefficients) and the numbers in parentheses are zero-order (Pearson r) correlation coefficients.

The data in Diagram 3 confirm all of the hypothesized relationships posited for Path II. Ethnic political consciousness is shown to have a direct and positive (although small) impact on participant political culture. Neither ethnic social cohesion nor social consciousness is demonstrated to have any direct relationship to participant political culture once ethnic political consciousness is controlled. Ethnic social cohesion, however, is a direct source of social consciousness (but not, as predicted, of political consciousness), and social consciousness, in turn, directly affects ethnic political consciousness.

As Diagram 3 indicates, ethnic identity is a very significant source of variation in the group dimensions of ethnicity. By itself it explains about 10% of the variance in social cohesion, 8% in social consciousness, and about 14% of the variation in ethnic political consciousness. Ethnic identity also continues to exhibit a strong direct relationship to participant political culture (unique R^2=.185), providing more support for the first part of our theory. It is interesting to note that, while SES exhibits a strong correlation with participant culture (beta=.32), it has no relationship to ethnic social cohesion and only weak causal links to ethnic social and political consciousness. It is only to ethnic identity that SES shows a strong connection; thus, the group dimensions of ethnicity appear to operate with considerable independence from SES.

Path III: Ethnic Identity, Neighboring Relations, and Participant Culture

One way that ethnic identity affects communal participation has already been identified--namely, through its direct relationship to participant political culture. But there is another path between identity and communal participation--a relationship that is mediated by neighboring relations. It

is this second path that will be explored here.

One relationship discovered by a number of researchers working in different cultural settings is that between culture and "social trust." Research on Italy, for example, has identified Italians as particularly lacking in social trust.[25] Our contention is that, as a result of cultural differences between ethnic groups, they also exhibit varying levels of social trust, which is reflected in different propensities to interact with "strangers" (in this case neighbors). Thus, when social trust is low, neighboring relations are likely to have little politically-relevant impact on the individual, for at least two reasons. First, conversations with neighbors are likely to be infrequent. They are likely to entail brief verbal exchanges, and they are unlikely to lead to new friendships. Second, when conversations with neighbors are infrequent, the content of such conversations tends to be superficial (e.g., about the weather). The more frequent conversations are, the more socially-relevant the topics of conversation will be. Particularly likely topics include community conditions or problems (like crime and safety, housing, and sanitation) and local politics.

What, then, is the relevance of neighboring relations for communal political activity? First, we contend that the frequency of conversations with members of the local community affects communal activity through its impact on political culture. The more frequently one talks with members of the community, the more he comes to identify with that community, the greater is his civic awareness, and the more likely is his community political knowledge to increase. Thus, the greater the frequency of neighboring relations, the greater the tendency to exhibit a participant political culture.

The content of neighboring relations also has an impact on political culture. The more frequently one discusses community problems, the more

likely neighboring relations are to affect one's political attitudes. Political involvement, civic awareness, and community political knowledge are expected to increase as the frequency and political content of neighboring relations increase, since social interaction tends to be a learning process. Political efficacy is also expected to be higher because the frequent discussant learns that others are also concerned about the community and can be drawn on for support for any action he might take on their behalf or in concert with them. We expect political cynicism to be exhibited by those who most frequently discuss community problems with their neighbors because they are more likely to be exposed to criticism of local government and its performance in dealing with community problems; as a result, trust in government tends to decline.

To summarize, ethnic identity affects the likelihood that individuals will interact in a socially meaningful way with members of the broader community. The lower the level of social trust, the less likely one is to engage in frequent and politically-relevant neighboring relations. Because low social trust may isolate the individual from social interaction, it tends to inhibit the development of participant political culture, and therefore indirectly impedes communal political participation.

Three separate regression equations were created to test the hypothesized causal links between ethnic identity, neighboring relations, and participant political culture. In the interests of brevity, the results of the analyses are presented in diagram form below. Age, sex, length of residence, and SES were used as controls. SES is included in the diagram. Neither age nor sex had any effect on neighboring relations, and both are therefore excluded from the analysis. Because of its high contamination with ethnic identity, length of residence is also excluded from Diagram 4 below.[26]



Diagram 4. Causal Links between Ethnic Identity, Neighboring Relations, and Political Attitudes.

The findings of the regression analyses summarized in Diagram 4 strongly confirm the hypothesized causal links between ethnic identity and neighboring relations. Ethnic identity is shown to have a strong impact on the frequency of neighboring relations. SES, on the other hand, is shown to have no relationship to the frequency of neighboring relations once ethnic identity is held constant (r=.15; beta=-.01). Both ethnic identity and SES have an impact on the political content of neighboring relations, as does the frequency of neighboring relations (beta=.35).

Both aspects of neighboring relations also have weak (but statistically significant) relationships to participant political culture.[27] That their zero-order relationships to participant culture are sharply reduced when the two variables are entered together into the regression equations is a result of their high intercorrelation. Thus, if both variables used to measure neighboring relations were combined to form a single index, the resultant beta would be considerably larger. It should also be noted that the direct relationships between ethnic identity and participant culture, on the one hand, and SES and culture, on the other, are somewhat reduced when neighboring relations are held constant.[28] Thus, the third causal path predicted from our theory (i.e., one mediated by neighboring relations) is essentially confirmed by empirical analysis.

The Overall Model: Ethnicity, Political Culture, and Communal Participation

Having dissected our theory for purposes of empirical analysis, we are now in the position to explore the validity of the overall model. Eight separate regression equations were created, and Diagram 5 below summarizes the results. SES, while included in all the regression equations as a control variable, is excluded from the diagram for purposes of visual clarity.



Diagram 5. The Overall Model of the Empirical Relationship between Ethnicity and Communal Political Participation, Holding SES Constant.

Diagram 5 neatly summarizes the major findings of this paper. All the causal links posited by our theory are confirmed by data shown in the diagram. The absence of a connecting arrow between any two variables means that the beta for the causally-prior variable is less than .10, and the unstandardized regression coefficient (B) is less than twice the standard error of B. These criteria, while somewhat arbitrary, were employed in order to help simplify presentation of the findings. It should also be noted that <u>all</u> two-variable relationships meeting the minimum standards for inclusion were those explicitly predicted from our theory.

One of the more interesting findings presented in Diagram 5 is the strong direct relationship between participant political culture and communal participation. Other than participant culture, no other independent variable in the analysis has a direct relationship to participation once political attitudes are controlled. The importance of political attitudes to participant culture can easily be seen by the size of the beta (.41), and the fact that controlling for other independent variables in the analysis reduces the zero-order relationship between attitudes and communal participation only from .49 to .42. Participant political culture is the only independent variable with a strong direct impact on communal participation, which allows us to focus our attention on the sources of participant culture itself.

Looking across the other relationships summarized in the diagram, it is remarkable how <u>stable</u> they remain when controlling for all other variables in the analysis. Three relationships, however, are exceptions to this general pattern: the frequency of neighboring relations with participant culture (r=.28; beta=.11); the political content of neighboring

relations with participant culture (r=.30; beta=.12); and ethnic identity with participant culture (original R^2=.362; unique R^2=.152). An explanation for the reduction in beta size for both measures of neighboring relations was offered earlier and need not be repeated here. But the substantial reduction in explained variance (i.e., unique versus original R^2) by ethnic identity deserves closer scrutiny, considering the central importance of ethnic identity to our theory.

Stepwise regressions were performed in an effort to understand the reasons for the reduced correlation between ethnic identity and participant political culture. By introducing SES first and ethnic identity second in the regression, it was discovered that ethnic identity explained an additional 21% of the variance in political attitudes; therefore, ethnic identity shares about 12% (or 1/3) of the variance explained in participant culture with SES. When ethnic social cohesion, social consciousness, and political consciousness were introduced first with SES and ethnic identity last in stepwise regression, ethnic identity explained an additional 18.5%, indicating that ethnic identity shares with the group dimensions of ethnicity about 5.5% of the variance explained in participant culture. Finally, the prior introduction of the two neighboring relations variables into the stepwise equation reduces the amount of explained variance for ethnic identity another 3%, to 15.2%.

The results of the stepwise regression analysis, then, do not lead us to question the genuineness of ethnic identity's impact on communal political participation. Rather, it stands to reason that, because ethnic identity is so highly correlated with SES and variables intervening between it and political attitudes, its unique explanatory power is bound to be lower than its zero-order relationship to participant culture. That it

continues to uniquely explain a full 15% of the variance in participant political culture is a testament to the political culture argument we are espousing in this paper.

CONCLUSION

We have been concerned first and foremost with the theory-building process. A partial theory[29] has been developed, identifying ethnicity as a major causal factor in political participation, and with the aid of survey research and statistical techniques, we have tested the theory by examining participation patterns among six ethnic groups in a residential section of Manhattan.

The major conclusion that can be drawn from our study is that ethnicity needs to be taken seriously as an important source of non-electoral participation at the local level. While theories relating ethnicity to electoral activity and political violence are not uncommon, the effects of ethnicity on other forms of participation have not been widely explored by students of participation and ethnicity. Our findings provide strong support for the position that political culture differences between ethnic groups help explain why participation levels of some ethnic groups are higher than those of other groups. In this concluding section, we will discuss some of the major implications of our study for ethnic politics and for participation theory.

Assimilation and Acculturation

For several decades, social scientists have become increasingly critical of the notion that ethnic groups were rapidly fading into the mainstream of society. Of course, race was considered a special case, and few anticipated a rapid breakdown of racial barriers. But religious divisions

were expected to lessen, and cleavages based on nationality to decline most rapidly. When study after study reported on the enduring nature of ethnic social divisions, social scientists began to re-evaluate their position. Continued (and perhaps intensified) racism and positive group attachment were seen as processes that would lead to a lasting basis of social stratification based on ethnicity.

If social scientists' views about the inevitability of assimilation were changing, the same cannot be said of their views on acculturation. As Michael Parenti points out, research findings supported the view of rapid acculturation for second and later generations of immigrant ancestry.[30] But how could acculturation be so rapid without assimilation? The answer many gave to this question revolved around the nature of the socialization process. The child of the immigrant was seen as being exposed to culturally unifying elements of the broader society, especially through educational institutions and the mass media. The child's social circle may have been highly circumscribed ethnically, but his exposure to the national (i.e., white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant) culture meant that, with each succeeding generation, value orientations were becoming more and more indistinguishable from those of the dominant society. It is only quite recently that this view of the acculturation process has been seriously challenged.

To argue against the prevailing acculturation model is not necessarily to support an extreme "cultural pluralism" model, which states that groups maintain their original immigrant cultures against the onslaught of the host society. Rather, there is another explanatory model that may shed light on why cultural differences could remain (or even increase) the longer the ethnic group exists in American society. According to this model, sometimes referred to as the ethnogenesis model, the original immigrant culture fuses

with the host culture to form a new entity. Thus, as time passes, it is conceivable that cultural distinctiveness may increase as the national culture is refracted through an ethnic lens.

The findings of our study would appear to support critics of the acculturation model. We uncovered major political attitude differences between the six ethnic collectivities examined, and although the use of survey research methods prevents us from determining whether such political culture differences are declining or increasing, nevertheless such differences were evident and aid us in understanding ethnic differences in communal participation.

Other findings of our study are also relevant to issues surrounding the assimilation process. We discovered that ethnic social cohesion (i.e., the opposite of assimilation) had very little direct impact on political attitudes or communal participation. Since the least and the most assimilated individuals were equally likely to exhibit participant political culture, one could legitimately wonder whether increased assimilation would lead to a more uniform political culture. In sum, the findings of this study seem to testify to the enduring nature of ethnic social, psychological, and cultural divisions. In terms of politics, such ethnic differences affect the level of participant political culture, as well as the level of communal participation.

SES and Ethnicity: Joint or Independent Effects?

In the Introduction, we raised the issue of the interrelationships between SES, ethnicity, and political participation. It was noted that SES and ethnicity might be related to participation in any of four possible

ways: they could have joint or separate impacts, one or the other could be spuriously related to participation (i.e., through the effects of the other), or both could be spuriously related to participation through their relationship to a third factor. Since SES and ethnicity have often been examined together in the empirical analysis of this study, we are in a position to shed some light on this issue.

Our findings support the proposition that SES and ethnicity, while sharing a certain amount of impact due to their statistical intercorrelation, have substantial separate influences on communal participation. SES, for instance, was found to have little effect on the group dimensions of ethnicity. It is statistically unrelated to ethnic social cohesion in our sample, and it has only a slight relationship to ethnic social consciousness and ethnic political consciousness. While there is a strong correlation (R=.48) between SES and ethnic identity, this does not mean that they exhibit only a joint impact on political attitudes or communal participation. Ethnic identity was found to be the best single predictor of variation in political attitudes among the variables examined. It explained 36% of the variance; SES explained only 24% of the variance in political attitudes. More importantly, when SES was entered first and ethnic identity last in stepwise regression, identity explained an additional 24% of the variance. The findings are clear with regard to political attitudes: a good percentage of the variance explained can be attributed to the independent impacts of ethnic identity and SES.

When ethnic identity and SES were examined as predictor variables for neighboring relations, their separate impacts were especially clear. SES had no impact on the frequency of neighboring relations, while ethnic identity was a major source of such frequency. Both ethnic identity and

SES exhibited influences on the political content of neighboring relations, with SES being the stronger predictor of the two. Since both the frequency and content of neighboring relations affect the level of participant political culture, the separate impacts of ethnic identity and SES help clarify the neighboring relations dimension of the model.

We maintain that much of ethnicity's impact on communal participation is independent of SES. This position, if true, has important implications for the analysis of political participation. The impact of ethnicity appears to be comparable in magnitude to that of SES. What Verba and Nie have called the "Standard SES Model" is perhaps in need of revision. We believe that it is accurate as far as it goes, but that other factors which it ignores (like ethnicity) may add a great deal to our understanding of participation.

Ethnicity, Participation, and Equality

One reason for the centrality of participation to democratic theory is the assumption that participation affects levels of social equality in society. Participation is tied to social equality through system responsiveness, since widespread participation presumably increases the likelihood that the political system will respond more equitably to citizen demands.

Our findings on the role of ethnicity in participation have implications for social equality. Since the holding of certain attitudes (e.g., political efficacy) predisposes an individual to participate in politics, such attitudes can be viewed as political resources that are unequally distributed. Therefore, anything that affects participant political culture also affects the level of political influence an individual can hope to exercise. We have shown that ethnicity can have a major

effect on the level of participant political culture, and through its effect on such culture, it can have a major effect on the level of participation. Discrimination and low socio-economic status have been demonstrated by others to limit the opportunities of some ethnic groups to receive benefits from the political system. We maintain that low levels of participant political culture can be a third basis for political (and therefore social) inequality.

The argument we have presented on political culture should not be construed as one which points to "fatal flaws" in the cultural makeup of some ethnic groups. One culture is not better or worse than another--it is simply <u>different</u>. If a political system responds to one kind of value system and not another, the problem lies with the <u>system</u> and its inability to respond to the needs of the entire population. But if an individual is born into an ethnic group whose level of participant political culture is low, he is at a disadvantage politically, because his socialization process is unlikely to predispose him to participate.

Even if cultural differences remain between ethnic groups, cultures do change. Low or high levels of participant political culture are not frozen into a group's existence. But cultural change is slow if such change is the result only of <u>individual</u> adaptation. Dramatic events and increased organizational activity and mobilization can be especially important to increasing levels of participant political culture. Black Americans, for example, may have acted as a prototype for other disadvantaged groups, and there is evidence that the experience of Blacks has had a kind of "demonstration effect" on American Indians, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans during the 1960's and 1970's. We have provided evidence that a high level of ethnic political consciousness influences the level of participant culture, as does

increased social interaction with members of the broader community. Thus, there are a number of factors that can strongly affect participant political culture, and such changes need not come about slowly.

In the comparison of different national political systems, it has become increasingly obvious that some systems are more adept at reducing inequalities based on socio-economic status. The class based structures of many European political systems appear to encourage participation among low-status individuals, because working-class parties can mobilize such individuals to participate on what are often clear-cut social class issues. One suspects that the absence of a developed social-class base for competition between political institutions, organizations, and actors in the United States means that individual characteristics, motivations, and value structures loom much larger as determinants of the level and style of American participation. One irony in this country is that ethnic political mobilization can lead to increased participation but at the same time prevent the emergence of social class issues in politics. That is, when ethnic groups of similar socio-economic status collide, their common socio-economic interests recede into the background.

If ethnic divisions are going to be enduring features of the socio-political landscape, social scientists and policy makers need to understand more fully the nature of ethnic divisions. If they do not, ethnic social policy may ultimately be misguided and perhaps destructive. The most important emphasis needs to be on identifying factors which create and maintain socio-political inequality. It is already clear that ethnic discrimination and low socio-economic status both lead to inequality. It may become increasingly clear that political culture is yet another source of inequality, and one which is in need of serious attention if inequality based on ethnicity is to be reduced or eliminated.

NOTES

1. Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), especially chap. 8.
2. Ibid., p. 209. Verba and Nie make reference to ethnicity only in the context of the social bases of political parties.
3. Robert E. Lane, Political Life: Why and How People Get Involved in Politics (New York: Free Press, 1959); Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics? (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965); and Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).
4. The concepts of achievement and ascription were, of course, first developed by Talcott Parsons to compare so-called traditional and modern societies. See his work, The Social System (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), for a full description of his "pattern variables," including the "achievement-ascription" dimensions of societies. Although Parsons uses this pattern variable to compare societies, it is still useful for conceptual distinctions between different forms of social stratification.
5. Implicitly, the argument is based on the notion that because SES is related to participation in non-ethnic populations, and because ethnic groups can be distinguished one from another along SES lines, differences in the level of participation between ethnic groups are merely the result of their SES differences. Milbrath, in Political Participation, makes perhaps one of the more extreme statements of this position when he states: "Physiological racial characteristics do not account for participation differences between races; rather, it is the relative social position of racial groupings that create these differences." (p.138) That there might be non-class differences between races that account, in part, for differences in participation is not acknowledged by Milbrath.
6. Those taking this view (implicitly or explicitly) rely on the notion of "eth-class," first developed by Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), chap. II.
7. See, e.g., Andrew M. Greeley, "Political Participation among Ethnic Groups in the United States: A Preliminary Reconnaissance," American Journal of Sociology 80 (July 1974):170-204. Using Verba and Nie's data, Greeley argues that ethnicity is a major predictor of political participation in America, even when SES is held constant.
8. Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973), pp. 54-55. The authors are citing unpublished data from the study on which Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965) was based.
9. Dahl and Tufte, Size and Democracy, p. 59. In the United States, 28% reported attempting to influence local government, while only 16% reported attempts to influence national government.
10. It is not really possible to catalogue all motives for voting, signing petitions, etc. But some of the major conscious motives that have been identified by researchers and that have no apparent direct relationship to promoting equality in the wider society include: habit, a sense of citizen duty, issue salience, peer group pressure, partisanship, and

political interest. Many participation studies deal with the issue of motive; see, e.g., Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter: An Abridgment (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), especially chap. 4; Milbrath, Political Participation, especially chap. 3; and Lane, Political Life, especially chap. 8.

11. The issue of how an observer or participant can with certainty identify motives for action has a long history in the social sciences. A major problem involves distinguishing between conscious and unconscious motives. In theory, one can utilize techniques like survey research to tap conscious motivation, but to identify unconscious motives is another matter. The problem of interpreting the motives in social actors runs throughout the works of Max Weber. For a brief but informative discussion of the way in which Weber's treatment of motivation is central to his positivist and non-Marxist orientation, see H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 55-61. Some authors have attempted to identify unconscious motives for political participation; see, e.g., Lane, Political Life, chap. 9. But this is a risky undertaking and well beyond the scope of the present paper. In making the distinction between motives for voting and those for contacting housing agencies, we are suggesting that conscious motives are not readily apparent from the mere act of voting, whereas the assumption of conscious problem-solving motives in relation to contacts with public service agencies seems relatively safe.
12. Verba and Nie, Participation in America, p. 113.
13. Ibid., pp. 125, 138,200, and 212.
14. 27.4% of the sample (N=379) were not U.S. citizens.
15. Although Verba and Nie, in Participation in America, did create an overall participation index with similar items, the loadings of three items in our factor analysis are much too low on the principal factor (I) to justify such a procedure for this study.
16. Cited in Alfred L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (New York: Vintage Books, 1952), p. 106.
17. Ibid., p. 106.
18. Florence R. Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck, Variations in Value Orientation (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1961), p. 4.
19. Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Political Culture and Political Development, eds. Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 517.
20. A principal components (PA2) factor analysis (without rotation) was also performed using these five attitudes. Only one factor resulted, with significant loadings (i.e., greater than .50) for all but political cynicism, which had a loading of only .32. Its lower loading reflects the fact that cynicism does not correlate very well with efficacy and knowledge. However, because its correlation is high with political involvement and civic awareness, and because of the theoretical import of cynicism in political analysis in general, we have decided to include it in the overall index of political attitudes.
21. The term "identity" may connote to some a psychological identification. As we use the term, however, it means one's objectively-determined ethnic background characteristics of race, religion, and/or nationality.
22. George Antunes and Charles M. Gaitz, "Ethnicity and Participation: A Study of Mexican-Americans, Blacks, and Whites," American Journal of Sociology 80 (March 1975): 1208.

23. When sex and age were introduced last into the analysis via stepwise regression, they explained less than 1% additional variance in political attitudes. Since the betas for sex and age suggest that these variables add little to our understanding of political attitudes, they can be safely dropped from the analysis that follows.

24. Commonality analysis, sometimes called elements analysis, is a method of decomposing the variance of a dependent variable into common and unique variances to allow the analyst to interpret the relative influences of n independent variables. In the three variable case, the following formula applies:

$$R^2_{y.123} = U(1) + U(2) + U(3) + C(12) + C(13) + C(23) + C(123)$$

For identifying each unique and common variance, the following formula applies:

$$U(1) = -R^2_{y.23} + R^2_{y.123}$$

$$U(2) = -R^2_{y.13} + R^2_{y.123}$$

$$U(3) = -R^2_{y.12} + R^2_{y.123}$$

$$C(12) = -R^2_{y.3} + R^2_{y.13} + R^2_{y.23} - R^2_{y.123}$$

$$C(13) = -R^2_{y.2} + R^2_{y.12} + R^2_{y.23} - R^2_{y.123}$$

$$C(23) = -R^2_{y.1} + R^2_{y.12} + R^2_{y.13} - R^2_{y.123}$$

$$C(123) = R^2_{y.1} + R^2_{y.2} - R^2_{y.12} + R^2_{y.3} - R^2_{y.13} - R^2_{y.23} + R^2_{y.123}$$

See Fred N. Kerlinger and Elazar J. Pedhazur, Multiple Regression in Behavioral Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973), pp. 297-305, for a more complete discussion of commonality analysis.

25. See, e.g., Almond & Verba, The Civic Culture, passim; also see Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: Free Press, 1958).

26. We, in fact, expected a correlation (r) between length of residence and the frequency of neighboring relations. It is obvious that people who have lived in a place the longest will have had more opportunities to interact with neighbors. But because the relationship between length of residence and ethnic identity was so strong (R=.69), it was felt that the existence of a genuine relationship between length of residence and the frequency of neighboring relations would tend to obscure the impact of ethnic identity on neighboring relations. Length of residence, therefore, was excluded from the analysis.

27. Six interaction terms were found to be statistically significant, five of which involved ethnic identity with the frequency of neighboring relations. The sixth involved Puerto Ricans only with the political content of neighboring relations ($F=4.041$, $P>.05$). In declining order of statistical significance, the five interaction terms involving ethnic identity and frequency of neighboring relations are as follows: Puerto Ricans ($F=18.761$, $P>.001$); Cubans ($F=11.253$, $P>.001$); Irish ($F=10.316$, $P>.001$); Dominicans ($F=5.657$, $P>.05$); and Blacks ($F=5.632$, $P>.05$). In all five ethnic collectivities the beta is positive, suggesting that one cannot talk about the relationship between frequency of neighboring relations and political attitudes without taking into account ethnic identity. This finding adds even further support to our contention that we are observing a cultural link (based on social trust) between ethnicity and political attitudes--a link that is mediated by neighboring relations.

28. However, the greatest reduction in impact for both ethnic identity and SES results from their strong intercorrelation (R .48). Ethnic identity and SES share about 12% of the variance explained in participant political culture.
29. The theory presented in this study is only partial in at least two respects: it is neither an attempt to explain all the causal links between ethnicity and all forms of participation, nor an attempt to explain participation in all contexts. For a more detailed discussion of the theoretical and empirical aspects of this paper, see my doctoral dissertation, "Ethnicity and Political Participation in New York City: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1977), especially chaps. 4 and 6.
30. Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification," American Political Science Review 61 (September 1967): 719.